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Invited Responses
A ROAD MAP THROUGH THE SUPREME COURT’S BACK ALLEY
CLARKE D. FORSYTHE* & BRADLEY N. KEHR**
“As today’s decision indicates, medical technology is changing, and this
change will necessitate our continued functioning as the nation’s ‘ex of-
ficio medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical and
operative practices and standards throughout the United States.’”1
“It is certainly difficult to understand how the Court believes that the
physician-patient relationship is able to accommodate any interest that
the State has in maternal physical and mental well-being in light of the
fact that the record in this case shows that the relationship
is non-existent.”2
—Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (1983)
I. INTRODUCTION
A decade after Roe v. Wade3 and Doe v. Bolton,4 Justice O’Connorpointed out that the Supreme Court had assumed the role of the Na-
tional Abortion Control Board.  Before effective abortion clinic regula-
tions can be drafted or implemented, the constraints of the Supreme
Court’s abortion doctrine—that Justice O’Connor only partially out-
lined—must be thoroughly understood.  In the wake of Gonzales v. Car-
hart,5 clinic regulations need to be reasonably designed to protect
maternal health.  If clinic regulations are going to meet that standard, the
short- and long-term risks of abortion need to be better understood.
* Senior Counsel of Americans United for Life and author of POLITICS FOR
THE GREATEST GOOD: THE CASE FOR PRUDENCE IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE (Intervarsity
Press 2009).  Copyright 2011 by Clarke D. Forsythe.  All rights reserved.
** Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. Candidate, 2012.
Acknowledgement: The authors are grateful to Denise Burke and Evangeline
Jones for comments on an earlier draft.
1. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 456
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 99 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), overruled
by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. Id. at 473.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
5. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
(45)
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Professor Calhoun wants to bring pro-lifers and pro-choicers together
to prevent future Gosnells.6  While preventing “future Gosnells” is a wor-
thy goal, we question several of his assumptions.  A majority of people—
including pro-lifers and pro-choicers—already support health and safety
regulations for abortion procedures.  The aim should be effective protec-
tion for women’s physical and psychological health, not merely the bar-
gain-basement goal of stopping the worst practitioners.  The main obstacle
to effective health and safety regulations is not a lack of majority support,
but rather the Supreme Court’s abortion doctrine, which was misguided
in its inception and has been contradictory in its application.  As we hope
to show, clinic regulations are fully justified by the substandard conditions
in clinics and by the inherent risks of abortion procedures.
II. THE IMPACT OF ROE V. WADE & DOE V. BOLTON
The Supreme Court, in its 1973 abortion decisions—Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton—swept away the abortion laws of all fifty states.7  The Court
virtually exempted abortion from the state public health systems by declar-
ing it to be the only medical procedure that is a constitutional right, and
by holding that there is no compelling interest in regulations that protect
maternal health in the first trimester.
Congress could not fill the vacuum.  Congress exercised virtually no
power over abortion before Roe unless it was tied to an enumerated power,
such as the Mail or the Spending Clause.8  Since Roe, Congress’s power
over abortion is still disputed.9  Since Congress’s constitutional authority
to fill the gap is doubtful, and the state and local governments have been
disabled by the Court, no level of government has clear authority to act
without federal court approval.
6. See Samuel W. Calhoun, Stopping Philadelphia Abortion Provider Kermit Gosnell
and Preventing Others Like Him: An Outcome That Both Pro-choicers and Pro-lifers Should
Support, 57 VILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Pro-
cess of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) (“And in Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton, when the Court had its most dramatic opportunity to express its supposed
aversion to substantive due process, it carried that doctrine to lengths few observ-
ers had expected, imposing limits on permissible abortion legislation so severe that
no abortion law in the United States remained valid.” (footnotes omitted)).
8. See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877) (applying act of Congress
regulating mail and banning “any article or thing designed or intended for the . . .
procuring of abortion”).
9. See, e.g., David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously:
Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59 (1997) (examining
whether Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is legitimate exercise of congressional
power); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power to Prohibit
Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319 (2005) (asserting Congress had
authority under Commerce Clause to pass Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act); Jordan
Goldberg, Note, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why Progressives Might
Be Tempted to Embrace Federalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (2006) (arguing progres-
sives should take approach other than Commerce Clause to support abortion
rights because conservative court could restrict rights under clause).
2
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A. No Record in Roe or Doe
The Court created the vacuum without any trial record in either Roe
or Doe.  The factual records in Roe and Doe were non-existent—consisting
merely of a complaint, an affidavit (unsigned by Jane Roe, signed by Mary
Doe), and motions to dismiss.10  In both cases, the three-judge district
courts proceeded to hold two-hour oral hearings in which the judges ad-
dressed procedural and jurisdictional issues more than substantive consti-
tutional or medical questions.  There were no factual hearings.  No
witnesses testified.  No testimony was given.  No medical data was re-
viewed.  There was no opportunity for cross-examination.  And then, with-
out any intermediate appellate review in either case, the Supreme Court
granted review.
The Justices took Roe and Doe under the misapprehension that they
were merely dealing with the application of Younger v. Harris11—decided
sixty days before the Court took Roe and Doe—which prohibited federal
court intervention in pending state criminal proceedings.  If the Court
had merely addressed the jurisdictional issues, it would not have needed a
full evidentiary record on the complex historical, legal, and medical issues
that the Court eventually addressed.  The expectation of dealing only with
jurisdictional issues may explain why the Justices took not one but two
cases with no evidentiary record.  At some point—possibly during the con-
ference after the first arguments on December 16, 1971—a majority de-
cided that they had jurisdiction and proceeded to address the abortion
issue without a record, instead of more prudently granting review to other
pending abortion cases with better records.12
10. See Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified, 410 U.S.
179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally 1-3 ROY M. MERSKY & GARY R. HARTMAN, A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
Roe v. Wade (1993).  In the first oral argument in Roe, the Texas Assistant Attorney
General stated, “The record that came up to this Court contains the amended
petition of Jane Roe, an unsigned alias affidavit, and that is all.”  Transcript of Oral
Argument at 16, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18) [hereinafter Roe Oral Argument],
available at http://www.aul.org/roe-v-wade-transcripts.  Additionally, during the
first oral argument in Doe, the Georgia Assistant Attorney General said, “That,
again, is not in the record because there was no evidence presented.”  Transcript
of Oral Argument at 17, Doe, 410 U.S. 179 (No. 70-40) [hereinafter Doe Oral Argu-
ment], available at http://www.aul.org/doe-v-bolton-transcripts.
11. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger was decided with Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82; Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200; Byrne v. Karalexis, 401
U.S. 216; and Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77.  All were decided February 23, 1971.
12. See Letter from Harry Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
William Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (July 20, 1987) (on file with
the Library of Congress, Harry Blackmun Papers, Box 151 and Box 1407, Folder
13) (“Potter pressed for Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton to be heard and did so in the
misapprehension that they involved nothing more than an application of Younger
v. Harris.  How wrong we were.”); see also LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE
BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 80 (2005) (quoting letter
from Justice Blackmun to Chief Justice Rehnquist); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER
HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 85-86 (1995) (relating
3
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The lack of an evidentiary record should have been a red flag to the
Justices.  Hearing such cases violated long-standing principles of not decid-
ing constitutional questions without a full record.13  However, a bloc of
four Justices—Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart—was eager to
strike down the abortion laws during the sixteen weeks that the Court was
“short-handed,” with seven Justices after the abrupt retirements of Justices
Black and Harlan in September 1971, and before the two new “Nixon
judges” could join the Court.14  All of the sociological and medical as-
sumptions that provided the premises for the Justices’ statements in the
abortion decisions were thus derived from the parties’ and amicus briefs
filed with the Court.  Among many other things, the record lacked any
data on the short- and long-term risks of abortion, or how the new “abor-
tion practice” might be regulated.
this account based on May 1991 interview with Justice Blackmun); BOB WOODWARD
& SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 165-69 (1979)
(relating this account from Justice William O. Douglas’s perspective).
13. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1991) (“We possess no
factual record of an actual or imminent application of [the statute] sufficient to
present the constitutional issues in ‘clean-cut and concrete form.’” (citation omit-
ted)); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (“We have often declined
to decide important questions regarding ‘the scope and constitutionality of legisla-
tion’ . . . in the absence of ‘an adequate and full-bodied record.’” (citations omit-
ted)); Pub. Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 113 (1962) (per curiam)
(“Adjudication of such problems, certainly by way of resort to a discretionary de-
claratory judgment, should rest on an adequate and full-bodied record.  The re-
cord before us is woefully lacking in these requirements.”); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (“Courts deal with cases upon the basis of the
facts disclosed, never with nonexistent and assumed circumstances.”); United
States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1344-45, 1345 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Robinson, J.,
concurring) (“Not only have any impediments to the Government’s capacity to
counter Blackwell’s constitutional arguments deprived us of the full benefits of the
adversary process, but the inadequacy of the record obscures the factual contours
of the problem and blurs perception of its legal ramifications.  Indeed, a well-de-
veloped record is essential to decision of any question, especially one constitu-
tional and novel in character, and the defective record we now have leaves open
the possibility that factors relevant to resolution of the constitutional issue may
escape judicial attention.”).
14. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE MAKING OF Roe v. Wade 551-56 (1994) (indicating that certain Justices wanted
to strike down abortion bans); see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POW-
ELL, JR. 337 (1994) (“‘I will be God-damned!  At lunch today, Potter expressed his
outrage at the high handed way things are going, particularly the assumption that
a single Justice if CJ can order things his own way, and that he can hold up for nine
anything he chooses, even if the rest of us are ready to bring down 4-3s for exam-
ple.’” (quoting Note from William Brennan, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
William O. Douglas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (June 1972) (on file with
Library of Congress, William O. Douglas Papers, Madison Building, Box 1590,
Folder 5))).  This note from Justice Brennan is misquoted, in part, in GARROW,
supra, at 556.  Garrow misquotes the passage as “for nine months.”  “Months” is not
in the original version of the note in the Douglas Papers in the Library of Con-
gress.  The context indicates that “nine” most likely refers to the number of Jus-
tices since the rest of the sentence refers to “4-3s.”
4
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The Court in Doe eliminated a two-physician concurrence, a residency
requirement, and a hospitalization requirement.15  Between 1967 and
1970, thirteen states amended their abortion prohibitions and allowed
abortion under certain circumstances.  Georgia adopted a hospitalization
requirement based on the then-existing policy position of the American
Medical Association (AMA).16  But the advocate for the Georgia plaintiffs
urged the Court to strike down the hospitalization requirement, claiming
that abortions in clinics were equally safe.  The Court obliged, without any
trial record of the experience under the Georgia law or that of any other
of the thirteen states that had legalized abortion between 1967 and 1970.
B. The Medical Mantra That Drove the Result in Roe
Since 1973, nearly every statement of history, law, and precedent in
Roe and Doe has been subjected to criticism.17  Perhaps Harvard Law Pro-
fessor Mark Tushnet, a clerk for Justice Thurgood Marshall during the
deliberations in Roe, summed up the consensus best: “It seems to be gener-
15. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 201.
16. This was the position of the AMA in 1967, the year before Georgia passed
its statute, and in 1970, the year the federal court challenge to the statute was filed.
See Medical News, J. AM. MED. ASS’N, July 10, 1967, at 27, 38 (“[T]he [AMA] is op-
posed to induced abortion except when . . . [t]he procedure is performed in a
hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals”); Com-
mittee on Human Reproduction, 201 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 544 (1967) (indicating AMA’s
opposition to induced abortions); AMAgrams, 213 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 359, 359
(1970) (resolving “[t]hat abortion is a medical procedure and should be per-
formed only by a duly licensed physician and surgeon in an accredited hospital
acting only after consultation with two other physicians”).
17. See generally ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING Roe v. Wade
Through the Courts (Dennis Horan et al. eds., 1987); JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DIS-
PELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY (2006); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW:
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991); MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); STEPHEN M. KRASON,
ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1984); Robert M. Byrn, An
American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1973);
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Nor Piety Nor Wit: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 6 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 379 (1974-1975); Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, Re-
storing Self-government on Abortion: A Federalism Amendment, 10 TEX. REV. L.& POL.
301 (2006); Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v.
Wade: Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85 (2005)
(collecting sources showing criticism of Roe); Dennis J. Horan et al., Two Ships Pass-
ing in the Night: An Interpretavist Review of the White-Stevens Colloquy on Roe v. Wade, 6
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 229 (1987); Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15
(1993); Arnold H. Loewy, Why Roe v. Wade Should Be Overruled, 67 N.C. L. REV. 939
(1989); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003); William W. Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitu-
tional Review from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision
Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677; Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Roe v.
Wade, 1985 BYU L. REV. 231; Robert A. Destro, Comment, Abortion and the Constitu-
tion: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975).
5
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ally agreed that, as a matter of simple craft, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for
the Court was dreadful.”18
But one critical element that has been almost completely overlooked
is the key medical premise that drove the result in the abortion decisions.
Based on the briefs and arguments, the Court adopted a medical man-
tra—that “abortion is safer than childbirth”—which was never addressed
by the district courts in either Roe or Doe.  There was no record on this
question.  While it was asserted in the appellants’ briefs, it was disputed by
the Assistant Attorneys General for Texas and Georgia, who pointed out
that there was no basis for it in the record and that significant data contra-
dicted the assertion.19  The adoption of the premise violated standards of
judicial notice, because it was a statistical proposition that was sharply
disputed.20
Justice Blackmun made two primary claims in his opinion regarding
the safety of abortion.  After contending (erroneously) that state abortion
statutes were passed solely to protect the health of the woman (and not
the unborn child),21 he stated in the Roe opinion that the situation had
changed:
[A]bortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first
trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively safe.
Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the
procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for
18. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretavism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 820 (1983).
19. See Doe Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 14; Roe Oral Argument, supra
note 10, at 22.
20. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) (declining to take
judicial notice when “[t]he problem is a complex one, about which widely differ-
ing views can be held, and, as such, it would be somewhat precipitate to take judi-
cial notice of one view over another on the basis of a record as barren as this”); see
also Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173 (1961) (“To extend the doctrine of
judicial notice to the length pressed by the respondent would require us to allow
the prosecution to do through argument to this Court what it is required by due
process to do at the trial, and would be ‘to turn the doctrine into a pretext for
dispensing with a trial.’” (quoting Ohio Bell Tele. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm., 301
U.S. 292, 302 (1937))).  Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), adopted post-Roe, would
not allow such a disputed statistical proposition: “The court may judicially notice a
fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known
within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED.
R. EVID. 201(b).
21. The literature demonstrating that state abortion laws were intended to
protect the unborn child and the health of the mother is voluminous. See generally
DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY, supra note 17; JOHN
KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: SOME ASPECTS OF THE LEGAL REGULA-
TION OF ABORTION IN ENGLAND FROM 1803 TO 1982 (1988); Linton, supra note 17,
app. A at 103-19 (asserting abortion laws were originally passed to protect unborn
life); James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 29 (1985) (asserting nineteenth-
century abortion statutes were passed with intent to protect unborn life).
6
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normal childbirth.  [Blackmun cited five medical sources in foot-
note 44 to support his assertion.]  Consequently, any interest of
the State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous
procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to
forgo it, has largely disappeared.22
Fourteen pages later, Justice Blackmun made a significant conclusion:
[T]he State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of
the mother [becomes] . . . compelling . . . in the light of present
medical knowledge . . . at approximately the end of the first tri-
mester.  This is so because of the now-established medical fact, re-
ferred to above at [page 149], that until the end of the first
trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in nor-
mal childbirth.  It follows that, from and after this point, a State
may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regu-
lation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of
maternal health.23
The “appear to be” on page 149 suddenly becomes an “established medi-
cal fact” on page 163.
Justice Blackmun immediately qualifies the “established medical fact”
with “may be less.”24  Despite the contradiction in this paragraph (and the
one on page 149), the Court adopted the medical mantra as fact.
The medical mantra was arguably the single most important premise
that drove the results in the abortion decisions.  It is difficult to exaggerate
its importance.  It formed the historical rationale for the right to abortion,
the trimester framework, the state interest analysis, the prohibition on
health and safety regulations in the first trimester, the limitations on
health and safety regulations in the second trimester, the “health” excep-
tion after viability, and the extreme deference to the subjective discretion
of the provider throughout.25  What’s left?
Unfortunately, it was false: there was no reliable medical data to sup-
port the mantra in 1973, and none were cited in either opinion.
Between them, Justices Blackmun and Douglas (in his concurring
opinion) cited seven medical articles, without analysis or discussion.26
This begs the question, How reliable are the seven sources?
The first, an April 1961 article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association by Christopher Tietze, is merely a self-styled “report” that com-
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
23. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95
YALE L.J. 639, 640 (1986) (“[T]wo medically determined times—the time when the
hazards of abortion surpassed those of childbirth, and the time of fetal viability—
appeared to form the structural foundation of the Roe trimester framework.”).
26. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 149 n.44; id. at 216 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring).
7
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ments on a so-called “International Conference on Abortion Problems
and Abortion Control,” held in May 1960 in then-Communist East Ger-
many.27  It is not an analysis of data, much less a peer-reviewed study, but a
report on conference papers addressing statistics from the 1940s and
1950s from Eastern European countries.  Moreover, much of Tietze’s re-
port is based on nothing more than personal communications with the
conference speakers, rather than published data.  No evidence is given
that any of the asserted statistics are reliable.
The second Tietze paper, from 1969, titled Mortality with Contraception
and Induced Abortion, claims to compare the risk of mortality from concep-
tion and abortion.28  Tietze begins by imagining a “statistical model” and
an express assumption of a mortality rate from childbirth of 20/100,000 as
“a reasonable approximation.”29  He then assumes an illegal abortion
mortality rate of 100/100,000 pregnancies.30  He calls this a “very rough
estimate, and, almost certainly conservative,” but gives no basis for such a
claim.31  This paper does not claim to compare mortality from childbirth
and abortion, and there is no data in the paper that would enable one to
make such a comparison.32  His methodology—which involves mixing and
matching numbers from different countries and from different time peri-
ods—suffers from obvious problems.
The third Tietze paper on “therapeutic abortions” from 1970 is a very
brief three-page report.33  This report did not claim to be a study of mater-
nal mortality from abortion compared to childbirth.  Very little is said
about maternal mortality; only bare numbers of deaths are reported.  The
category of therapeutic abortion is undefined, and there is no consistent
measure in the paper that limits his analysis to “therapeutic” abortions.
The data in this article were from the Professional Activities Survey (PAS)
“conducted by the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities,”
which involved the voluntary participation of hospitals.34  Tietze made four
devastating concessions: that the hospitals in the PAS were “not a random
sample,” that there was no reliable statistical information on therapeutic
abortions in hospitals, that the data presented could only be used to arrive
27. See generally Christopher Tietze & Hans Lehfeldt, Legal Abortion in Eastern
Europe, 175 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1149 (1961).
28. See Christopher Tietze, Mortality with Contraception and Induced Abortion,
STUDS. FAM. PLANNING, Sept. 1969, at 6.  This article is sometimes mis-cited as “Mo-
rality with Contraception and Induced Abortion.”
29. See id. at 6.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Instead, Tietze simply cites another paper of his, “in print,” which pur-
portedly gives an abortion mortality rate of 3/100,000 in Hungary, Czechol-
slovakia, and Slovenia for the 1957-1967 period. Id. at 6 n.1 (citing Christopher
Tietze, Abortion Laws and Abortion Practices in Europe, in 5 ADVANCES IN PLANNED
PARENTHOOD (Aquiles J. Sobrero ed., 1970).
33. See Christopher Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions, 1963 to 1968,
STUDS. FAM. PLANNING, Nov. 1970, at 5, 7.
34. See id. at 5.
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at “rough estimates of the numbers of therapeutic abortions,” and that the
true number of such abortions “may well have been 10 per cent smaller or
20 per cent larger than the estimate shown.”35
The fourth source, a 1970 paper by Malcolm Potts, contains no data
and no supporting studies.36  Virtually all assertions on data are undocu-
mented and have no citations whatsoever.
The fifth source, a Vera Kolblova “article,” is really a six-paragraph letter
to the editor.37  Kolblova comments on Czech abortion law since 1957 with
the purpose of showing that the law “has great advantages and ameliorates
health problems.”38  Kolblova describes the law, includes some statistics
from 1957 to 1964 on complications and deaths, and asserts that the law
accomplished its purpose “to limit the number of criminal abortions and
reduce the number of consequent complications and deaths.”39  The pur-
pose of this letter to the editor is not to contend that abortion is safer than
childbirth, and, in any case, there are no data to support that proposition.
The sixth source, authored by K.H. Mehland, a professor from East
Germany, is from the May-June 1966 issue of the World Medical Journal.40
No graph, figure, or table shows maternal mortality from abortion (legal
or illegal) or childbirth.  He merely claims that the abortion mortality rate
“now stand[s] at 6 deaths per 100,000 operations performed in hospitals
by specialists.”  No mention is made of any possible long-term risks.  Meh-
land cites no publications and has no bibliography.
The seventh source is probably the most important—a June 1971 re-
port on data from New York City supposedly documenting the city’s expe-
rience since New York legalized abortion on July 1, 1970.41  The report
encompassed no more than the first ten to eleven months of legalization
in New York.  Critics at the time pointed out that more than fifty percent
of New York City abortion patients were non-residents and lost to follow-
up.  Their health status after abortion could not be verified.
The medical mantra in Roe was based entirely on these seven medical
sources.  Justice Blackmun cited the mantra twice in his opinion (and
once in Doe42), and Justice Douglas also cited the mantra.43  None of the
35. See id.
36. See D.M. Potts, Post-contraceptive Control of Fertility, 8 INT’L J. GYNAECOLOGY &
OBSTETRICS 957, 967 (1970).




40. See K.H. Mehland, Combating Illegal Abortion in the Socialist Countries of Eu-
rope, WORLD MED. J., May-June 1966, at 84.
41. Abortion Mortality, 20 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 208, 209 (1971).
42. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 190 (1973) (“[A]dvances in medicine and
medical techniques have made it safer for a woman to have a medically induced
abortion than for her to bear a child.”).
43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973) (“Mortality rates for women
undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or
9
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seven sources contained any data to support the mantra; none provided
reliable data from which to confidently compare maternal mortality and
childbirth mortality as of 1972.  And there was no consideration whatso-
ever of long-term risks.
Instead of these seven sources, the Court should have looked at ex-
isting obstetrical textbooks, which commonly cull published articles for
the best existing data.  But no medical textbooks are cited in Roe to sup-
port the mantra because the mantra is never cited in any of the leading
obstetrical textbooks published before 1972: Willson’s 4th edition (1971)
never cites it,44 nor Williams Obstetrics 14th edition (1971),45 nor Novak’s
Textbook of Gynecology 8th edition (1970),46 nor J.P. Greenhill’s 13th edition
(1965),47 nor Reid and Ryan’s obstetrical text,48 nor even Danforth’s 3d
edition, published four years after Roe.49
The Court also disregarded contrary data.  Justice Douglas’s law clerk
(RLJ), wrote a memo to Douglas on October 27, 1971, before the first oral
lower than the rates for normal childbirth.” (citing Potts, supra note 36, at 967);
Abortion Mortality, supra note 41, at 209; Tietze & Lehfeldt, supra note 27, at 1152;
Tietze, supra note 28, at 6; Tietze, supra note 33, at 7; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163
(“[U]ntil the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mor-
tality in normal childbirth.”).
44. See J. ROBERT WILLSON ET AL., OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 173-79 (4th
ed. 1971).
45. See LOUIS M. HELLMAN & JACK A. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 520
(14th ed. 1971) (“It is a common fallacy, particularly in lay publications, to exag-
gerate the number of maternal deaths attributable to abortion each year.  For ex-
ample, Pilpel and Norwick state that ‘illegal (out-of-hospital) abortions account for
as many as 8,000 maternal deaths each year.’  Although the exact number is un-
known, in 1967 there was a total of only 50,683 deaths of women, aged 15 to 44,
and only 987 maternal deaths.  The often quoted high figure is therefore obviously
impossible.  The National Center for Health Statistics records 160 abortion deaths
in 1967.”); David J. Garrow, Roe v. Wade Revisited, 9 GREEN BAG 71, 77 (2005)
(reviewing WHAT Roe v. Wade Should Have Said (Jack M. Balkin et al. ed., 2005))
(noting that scholar “corrects a commonly-made abortion-rights error by rightly
noting that in the years before Roe only a few hundred women per year died from
illegal abortions, not the thousands upon thousands that some writers—[Cass]
Sunstein in this volumes says ‘as many as 10,000’ annually—wrongly claim” ).
46. See EDMUND R. NOVAK ET AL., NOVAK’S TEXTBOOK OF GYNECOLOGY 570-71
(8th ed. 1970) (“Women should be discouraged from using abortion, which car-
ries potential physical and psychological hazards, as a method of family
planning.”).
47. See Emanuel A. Friedman, Therapeutic Abortion, in OBSTETRICS 588, 588
(J.P. Greenhill ed., 13th ed. 1965) (“Despite this attitude of liberality, induced
abortion even under the most ideal circumstances is not without danger and
should not be approached lightly.  The incidence of serious complications has
been reported in the range of 3 to 19 per cent, depending on the technique used.
Death rates range from 6 per 1000 to 6 per 100,000.” (citations omitted)).
48. See DUNCAN E. REID ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN REPRO-
DUCTION 274 (1972) (“Regardless of indications or the methods and procedures,
the physical and psychologic risks are real, even under the most careful scrutiny
and medical supervision, and the long-term effects are not entirely clear.”).
49. See OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 236-37 (David N. Danforth ed., 3d ed.
1977).
10
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argument, noting that a brief filed by “Certain Members of the American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists” on October 15 “contains a fairly
extensive survey of the medical hazards attendant to legally induced
abortions.”50
The unreliability of the New York City data from 1970 to 1971 was
brought directly to Justice Blackmun’s attention by his law clerk.  An un-
dated, unsigned, one-page memo in Justice Blackmun’s papers show that
his law clerk pointed out the “devastating” criticism of the New York City
data that had been made by one medical brief, showing that more than
fifty percent of the women who underwent abortions in New York City
were lost to subsequent follow-up, so their health outcome could not be
determined.51  As Justice Blackmun was famously known to do,52 he ed-
ited the clerk’s grammar, but ignored the problem by citing the New York
data without comment, though it is possible that the “appear to be” qualifi-
cation on page 149 and the “may be less” qualification on page 163 are
due to this memo.
So, the mantra—the sole premise on which the Court relied to pro-
hibit first-trimester regulations, limit second-trimester regulations, and ex-
tend the abortion right to viability and beyond—was based on no factual
record and no reliable medical data.  The Justices did not analyze, let
alone refute, the contrary data; they simply ignored them.
C. The Abrupt Expansion of the Abortion Right to Viability (and Beyond)
The problems did not end with the medical mantra.  Another factor
that paved the way for the Gosnell scandal, especially the problem of live-
birth abortions, was the Court’s arbitrary expansion of the abortion right
to viability, and beyond.  As scholars have pointed out, the viability rule
was complete dictum in Roe,53 and in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
50. Memorandum from RLJ to Justice Douglas (Oct. 27, 1971) (on file with
the Library of Congress, William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1590, Folder 5).
51. Memorandum from Law Clerk to Justice Blackmun (n.d.) (on file with
the Library of Congress, Harry Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 8).
52. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 12, at 107 (“And he himself reviewed his
clerks’ work, not only correcting their spelling and punctuation but also checking
the accuracy of the citations in the opinions they drafted for him.  No other justice
engaged in this level of detailed review.”); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACK-
MUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE 143, 152, 346 (2008) (demonstrating that Justice
Blackmun was difficult to work for and “extraordinarily alert to errors of spelling
and grammar”).
53. See, e.g., Randy Beck, Self-conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Tri-
mester Framework, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 507 (2011) (noting that “Justices who
joined Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe were self-consciously creating dicta”); see
also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 922 (1973) (“The opinion strikes the reader initially as a sort of guidebook,
addressing questions not before the Court and drawing lines with an apparent
precision one generally associates with a commissioner’s regulations.”); Mark
Tushnet, Two Notes on the Jurisprudence of Privacy, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 75, 83 (1991)
(“[U]sing the line of viability to distinguish the time when abortion is permitted
11
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Pennsylvania v. Casey54 as well.55  It was not relevant to the Texas or Geor-
gia statutes.  It was not addressed by the lower courts.  There was no re-
cord on viability or its implications.  It was not briefed or argued in the
Supreme Court.  The word was not mentioned in four hours of oral argument in
Roe and Doe in December 1971 and October 1972.56
Early drafts of the opinions in Roe and Doe designated the end of the
first trimester as the “decisive moment” beyond which the states could pro-
hibit abortion.57  Only after the second oral argument in October 1972,
when the Justices began negotiating about the abortion right they were
creating, did some Justices suggest that the right be expanded to viabil-
ity.58  That was finally done in Justice Blackmun’s third draft of December
21, 1972, four weeks before the opinions were released.59
Beyond the dictum, the Court had no medical data suggesting that
abortion was safe after twelve weeks.  In fact, the primary assertion made at
oral argument in the first and second Doe arguments by Margie Pitts
Hames, the attorney for the Georgia plaintiffs, was that the risks increased
considerably after twelve weeks.60
from the time after viability when it is prohibited (as Roe v. Wade does), is entirely
perverse.”).
54. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also
Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. REV.
713, 715-19 (2007) [hereinafter Beck, Essential Holding] (arguing issue of viability is
dicta); Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249,
250 n.9 (2009) [hereinafter Beck, Viability Rule] (“[T]he plurality’s retention of
the viability rule can be viewed as dicta.”).
55. See Beck, Essential Holding, supra note 54, at 717.
56. See Doe Oral Argument, supra note 10; Roe Oral Argument, supra note 10.
57. See Beck, Essential Holding, supra note 54, at 722-23 (discussing early drafts
setting first trimester as cutoff (citing GARROW, supra note 14, at 580-81; Garrow,
supra note 45, at 79)).
58. See Beck, supra note 53, at 521-23 (quoting memorandum from Justice
Powell to Justice Blackmun suggesting viability as possible line); GARROW, supra
note 14, at 580 (“‘[T]he end of the first trimester is critical.  This is arbitrary, but
perhaps any other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbi-
trary.’” (quoting memorandum from Blackmun to other Justices)); GARROW, supra
note 14, at 581 (“‘For the stage subsequent to the first trimester, the State may, if it
chooses, determine a point beyond which it restricts legal abortions to stated rea-
sonable therapeutic categories that are articulated with sufficient clarity so that a
physician is able to predict what conditions fall within the stated classifications.’”
(quoting second draft of November 22, 1972, in Roe)).
59. See GARROW, supra note 14, at 585-86; Beck, supra note 53, at 525 (“Justice
Blackmun’s third draft of the Roe opinion was the first to include the trimester
framework.”).
60. See Doe Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 6; OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY,
supra note 49, at 237 (“Complication rates are three to four times higher for sec-
ond-trimester abortions than for first-trimester abortions.”).  In 2004, second-tri-
mester abortions still carried greater risks than first-trimester abortions. See Linda
A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the United
States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 731 (2004) (finding relative risk of
abortion related mortality substantially higher in second trimester: 14.7/100,000 at
thirteen to fifteen weeks, 29.5/100,000 at sixteen to twenty weeks, and 76.6/
100,000 at or after twenty-one weeks).
12
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D. The “Health” Exception after Viability
Next, the Court expanded the abortion right beyond viability.  It an-
nounced that regulations or prohibitions after viability were not permitted
if the woman’s “health” was at issue. Roe and Doe were to be “read to-
gether.”61  The Court defined “health” as “all factors—physical, emo-
tional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-
being of the patient.”62  It vested the provider with complete, subjective
discretion to decide whether “emotional well-being” after viability was at
issue.63  If the provider decides that the woman’s emotional well-being
would be affected by the requirements of the regulations after viability, the
provider has the discretion to ignore the regulations.
The health exception means that any provider, with complete discre-
tion, can ignore any regulation if the provider concludes that the patient’s
emotional well-being is affected by the requirements of the regulation.
The definition was reiterated in 1979 in Colautti v. Franklin,64 and the
Third Circuit’s broad interpretation was affirmed by the Supreme Court in
1986 in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.65
Though Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia suggested in 1998 that the
health exception was not a constitutional mandate,66 that suggestion was
in a dissent from a denial of certiorari, and a number of federal courts
have held otherwise.67
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
62. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
63. See id. (“[T]he medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all fac-
tors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant
to the well-being of the patient.  All these factors may relate to health.  This allows
the attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical judgment.”);
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1997)
(“The Court suggested, however, that it favored providing broad discretion to phy-
sicians to make determinations as to ‘medical necessity’ in the abortion context
. . . .”).
64. 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979) (“The contested provisions in [United States v.
Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), and Doe v. Bolton] had been interpreted to allow the
physician to make his determination in the light of all attendant circumstances—
psychological and emotional as well as physical—that might be relevant to the well-
being of the patient.  The present statute does not afford broad discretion to the
physician.”).
65. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (affirming Third Circuit’s definition of health excep-
tion), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
66. See Voinovich v. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1039 (1998)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our conclusion that the statutory phrase at issue in Doe
was not vague because it included emotional and psychological considerations in
no way supports the proposition that, after viability, a mental health exception is
required as a matter of federal constitutional law.”).
67. See, e.g., Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 210; Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1984) (“It is clear from the Su-
preme Court cases that ‘health’ is to be broadly defined.  As the Court stated in Doe
v. Bolton, the factors relating to health include those that are ‘physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, [as well as] the woman’s age.’” (quoting Doe, 410 U.S. at
192)), aff’d, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Schulte v. Douglas, 567 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (D.
13
Forsythe and Kehr: A Road Map Through the Supreme Court's Back Alley
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-1\VLR103.txt unknown Seq: 14  9-MAY-12 15:03
58 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 45
As Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon has noted:
Doe’s broad definition of “health” spelled the doom of statutes
designed to prevent the abortion late in pregnancy of children
capable of surviving outside the mother’s body unless the
mother’s health was in danger.  By defining health as “well-be-
ing,” Doe established a regime of abortion-on-demand for the en-
tire nine months of pregnancy, something that American public
opinion has never approved in any state, let alone nationally.68
Consequently, as a number of commentators have noticed, the post-viabil-
ity prohibitions on the books in thirty-eight states have been unenforce-
able for many years.69
On top of the health exception is the “medically necessary” standard
in abortion law that gives subjective discretion to the abortion provider.70
“Medically necessary” does not mean seriousness or emergency in abor-
tion law.  A medically necessary abortion is whatever an abortion provider,
in the provider’s subjective judgment, determines it to be.71  At least as of
Neb. 1981) (striking Nebraska post-viability abortion limitation because it did not
allow for abortions under Doe health exception); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181, 196 (E.D. La. 1980) (striking Louisiana post-viability abortion limitation
because it did not meet Doe health exception).
68. Mary Ann Glendon, From Culture Wars to Building a Culture of Life, in THE
COST OF “CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION 3, 5 (Erika Bachi-
ochi ed., 2004); see also DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 672 (“By 1971, those who sought to change abortion laws in the
United States were seeking a total repeal of all abortion laws—’abortion on de-
mand’ as they then put it.” (citation omitted)).
69. See Voinovich, 523 U.S. at 1039 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The vast majority
of the 38 States that have enacted postviability abortion restrictions have not speci-
fied whether such abortions must be permitted on mental health grounds.”); see
also Michael J. Tierney, Note, Post-viability Abortion Bans and the Limits of the Health
Exception, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 465, 466-67 (2004) (“Three quarters of the states
have legislation banning post-viability abortions.  The majority of these states pro-
vide an exception to preserve the life or health of the mother, without defining
what ‘health’ means, while other states expressly allow ‘health’ to include mental
health.” (footnotes omitted)); Brian D. Wassom, Comment, The Exception That
Swallowed the Rule?: Women’s Professional Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental
Health Exception to Post-viability Abortion Bans, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 799, 810-11
(1999) (referring to Justice Thomas’s dissent (citing Voinovich, 523 U.S. at 1036)).
70. See, e.g., Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 287 (2d Cir.
2006) (“[T]he procedure might sometimes be necessary to avoid risk to a woman’s
health.”), vacated, 224 F. App’x 88 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Planned Parenthood
Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that restric-
tions of abortion methods require exceptions when method is “ ‘necessary, in ap-
propriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother’” (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000))), rev’d, Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir.
2005) (same), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124; Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1012
(D. Neb. 2004) (“[T]here are times when the banned procedure is medically nec-
essary to preserve the health of a woman . . . .”), rev’d, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124.
71. See, e.g., Doe, 410 U.S. at 192 (“Whether . . . ‘an abortion is necessary’ is a
professional judgment that the [ ] physician will be called upon to make rou-
14
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2006 in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England72—where the
Court stated that “a State may not restrict access to abortions that are ‘nec-
essary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother’”—this standard was alive and well.73  When these
two terms are combined—“medically necessary to preserve the health of
the woman”—a medically necessary abortion means any abortion a pro-
vider agrees to perform for any reason.74  The subjective elasticity of this
standard is compounded by the courts’ loose references to “risk.”  Risk is
simply “exposure to the chance of injury or loss.”75 Thus, “health risk” in
abortion law means the potential for exposure to the chance of a loss of “well-being”
under Doe v. Bolton.
These standards define the ease with which the federal courts can
eliminate or enjoin abortion regulations and, in turn, the inhibitions and
obstacles that state and local public health officials confront in attempting
to regulate in this area.  This public health vacuum—the prohibition on
first-trimester regulations, the expansion to viability, and the health excep-
tion after viability—created the context for Kermit Gosnell’s practices.
Aside from the politics of the Gosnell scandal, who’s to say other than Dr.
Kermit Gosnell—given the scope of the Doe health exception—whether
tinely.”); Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 208-09 (noting “importance of giving the physician
discretion to decide whether an abortion is necessary” and finding that health ex-
ception unconstitutionally limited “the physician’s discretion to determine
whether an abortion is necessary to preserve the woman’s health”); Roe v. Norton,
522 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 1975); Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 618, 622 n.23 (3d Cir.
1975) (emphasizing physician discretion), rev’d on other grounds, 432 U.S. 438
(1977); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072, 1082 (D.N.H. 1976); Roe v. Norton, 408
F. Supp. 660, 663-64 (D. Conn. 1975) (equating medically necessary and elective
abortion), rev’d, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Roe v. Ferguson, 389 F. Supp.
387, 392 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (equating “necessary medical services” with “elective”),
rev’d, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 191-92
(W.D. Pa. 1974) (same); Klein v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Ctr., 347 F. Supp. 496, 500
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (same), vacated, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
72. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
73. Id. at 327-28 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 879 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Whether the medically nec-
essary discretionary standard survives Gonzales v. Carhart is uncertain, but obviously
federal district courts can still cite numerous cases as authority in support of it.
74. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979) (“The contested provi-
sions in those cases had been interpreted to allow the physician to make his deter-
mination in the light of all attendant circumstances—psychological and emotional
as well as physical—that might be relevant to the well-being of the patient.”); Wo-
men’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (Tarnow, J.,
dissenting) (“To determine whether an abortion is medically ‘necessary,’ the
Court in Doe stated that ‘medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all
factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant
to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health.’  Decided on the
same day and meant ‘to be read together,’ Doe and Roe indicate that a woman’s
mental health, in addition to her physical health, must be considered in assessing
whether an exception to an abortion regulation actually preserves the health of
the pregnant woman.” (quoting Doe, 410 U.S. at 165, 191-92)).
75. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1660 (2d ed. 1998).
15
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emotional well-being wasn’t involved in each of the late-term abortions
that Gosnell has done since he opened his clinic in 1973?
E. The Mechanical Comparison of Abortion Mortality
and Childbirth Mortality Rates
The mantra that “abortion is safer than childbirth” is based on a
mechanical comparison of the published abortion mortality rate and the
maternal (childbirth) mortality rate.  The two published rates are not
comparable, however, and do not give an accurate picture about the risks
of abortion.76  The accuracy of the rate is completely dependent on an
accurate number of deaths—the numerator.  There are serious reasons to
doubt the accuracy of published figures on abortion deaths in the United
States; there is no uniform, mandatory tracking and reporting system of
abortion deaths (mortality) or injuries (morbidity) at the state or federal
level.77
In addition, the two rates are inherently not comparable because
their denominators are completely different.  They might be comparable
if both rates were composed of deaths (from abortion and childbirth) per
1,000 pregnancies, but that is not what is involved.  Different elements go
into the denominators.
The maternal mortality rate is defined by the Federal Centers for Dis-
ease Control & Prevention (CDC) as all maternal deaths per 100,000 live
births, rather than pregnancies.
Using live births instead of pregnancies shrinks the denominator
(since pregnancies are a larger group, and some end in miscarriage or
stillbirth) and thereby inflates the maternal mortality rate.  The use of live
births as the denominator is dictated by the World Health Organization
76. See David C. Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with Abortion Compared to Child-
birth—A Review of New and Old Data and the Medical and Legal Implications, 20 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 318 (2004).
77. Only estimates are available. See generally David Grimes, Estimation of Preg-
nancy-Related Mortality Risk by Pregnancy Outcome, United States, 1991 to 1999, 194 AM.
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 92 (2006).  Researchers from the Alan Guttmacher
Institute (AGI) hinted at the problems with the CDC incidence data, though with
understatement:
The estimates presented in this report are subject to some limitations and
should be considered provisional.  First, not all states are included; the
estimates assume that changes in abortion incidence in the excluded
states are similar to the overall trend seen in the reporting states.  Sec-
ond, the completeness of abortion reporting to state health departments
can vary from year to year.  We attempted to exclude all states that had
inconsistent reporting, but if (for example) reporting improved in some
states we included, it would mean that earlier state reports were too low
and that the percentage decline we calculated was too small.  In such
cases, our new estimates of the number of abortions would be too high.
LAWRENCE B. FINER & STANLEY K. HENSHAW, GUTTMACHER INST., ESTIMATES OF U.S.
ABORTION INCIDENCE, 2001-2003, at 3 (2006), available at http://www.guttmacher.
org/pubs/2006/08/03/ab_incidence.pdf.
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(WHO) for purposes of enhancing international comparability.78  In addi-
tion, the CDC depends on voluntary reporting systems and estimates that
maternal deaths are underreported by 30 to 150 percent.79  The death
certificate data may or may not tell if the death was maternal or abortion-
related.80
By contrast, the abortion mortality rate is defined by the CDC as “known
legal induced abortion-related” deaths per 100,000 legal abortions.
Abortion Mortality Rate =
Known Legal Induced Abortion Related Deaths
100,000 Legal Abortions
The identification of a “legal” abortion—when one considers all the
potential regulations at the local, state, or federal level that could theoreti-
cally apply, as well as the overlay of the Supreme Court’s thirty cases on
abortion since 1973—is prone to being highly subjective and manipulated.
In addition, both the numerator and denominator in this rate are also
based on voluntary reporting.81
WHY THE MORTALITY RATES FOR ABORTION AND CHILDBIRTH
ARE NOT COMPARABLE
78. See Letter from Julie Louis Gerberding, Dir., Ctrs. for Disease Control and
Prevention, to Walter M. Weber, Senior Litig. Counsel, Am. Ctr. for Law & Justice
(Jul. 20, 2004), reprinted in Amicus Brief of the Am. Ctr. For Law & Justice in Sup-
port of Petitioner add. at *24, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-
1382), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 613.
79. See Jeani Chang et al., Pregnancy-Related Mortality Surveillance—United States,
1991-1999, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., NO. SS-2, 2003, at 7; Catherine
Deneux-Tharaux et al., Underreporting of Pregnancy-Related Mortality in the United
States and Europe, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 684 (2005).
80. See Letter from Julie Louis Gerberding to Walter M. Weber, supra note 78.
81. Cf. Reardon et al., supra note 76.
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Beyond the inherent difference in what these rates measure, there are
additional problems.  The maternal mortality figures do not take account
of the stage of gestation.  A genuine comparison would assess only the
prospective risk of continuing the pregnancy from the time in gestation
when the decision is made (e.g., the risk for this particular woman at eight
weeks) rather than the mathematical risk throughout pregnancy.  The ma-
ternal mortality rate for gestational age is not adjusted because it is not
statistically feasible; those data are not available because death certificates
do not provide data on gestational age.
In 2004, Dr. Julie Gerberding, then-director of the CDC, discouraged
a mechanical comparison and warned that these rates cannot be com-
pared because they are different measures.  She emphasized that the two
rates “are conceptually different and are used by CDC for different public
health purposes.”82
These elements—the lack of any factual record, the false medical
mantra, the invalidation of a hospitalization requirement, the expansion
of the abortion license to viability, the prohibition on health and safety
regulations in the first trimester, the restrictions on health and safety viola-
tions in the second trimester, the disregard of existing data on the greatly
increased risks to women after the first trimester, the health exception
after viability which prevents the enforcement of prohibitions—created
the public health vacuum that led to the Gosnell scandal, and others.83
III. HOW THE FEDERAL COURTS ENFORCED THE PUBLIC HEALTH VACUUM
The federal courts quickly enforced Roe and Doe to prevent any clinic
regulations in the first trimester.  The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Cir-
cuits,84 along with a number of federal district courts in the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits,85 invalidated first-tri-
mester clinic regulations.
82. Letter from Julie Louis Gerberding to Walter M. Weber, supra note 78, at
*25.
83. In January 2012, Steven Chase Brigham and Nicola Riley were indicted in
Maryland for the homicide of viable unborn children after “police . . . said they
found nearly three dozen late-term fetuses in a freezer.”  Peter Hermann, Doctor
Arraigned in Maryland on Murder Charges in Abortion Case, BALT. SUN, Jan. 6, 2012,
www.baltimoresun.com/news/breaking/bs-md-abortion-doctor-arraigned-
20120106,0,1944360.story.
84. See Birth Control Ctrs., Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352, 365 (6th Cir. 1984);
Mahoning Women’s Ctr. v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated on
other grounds, 477 U.S. 918 (1980); Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526-27 (6th
Cir. 1976); Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chi. Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1149
(7th Cir. 1974); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1974).
85. See, e.g., Fla. Women’s Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Smith, 536 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.
Fla. 1982); Fla. Women’s Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Smith, 478 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Fla.
1979); Westchester Women’s Health Org. v. Whalen, 475 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Women’s Med. Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Cannon, 463 F. Supp. 531 (D.R.I.
1978); Fox Valley Reprod. Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Arft, 446 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D.
Wis. 1978); Abortion Coal. of Mich., Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 426 F.
18
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The Supreme Court supported the action of the federal courts, deny-
ing review in 197586 and affirming invalidation of first-trimester clinic reg-
ulations in 1976.87  The latter prompted a strong dissent by Justices White,
Burger, and Rehnquist.88
In Chicago, for example, the federal appeals court struck down Chi-
cago’s clinic regulations in 1974, and four years later, in November 1978,
the Chicago Sun-Times published a twelve-part series on the terrible condi-
tions found in abortion clinics based on an undercover investigation with
the Better Government Association (BGA).  As Dr. Edward F. King, the
deputy director of the Chicago Medical Society told the Chicago Tribune in
1978, “The courts very effectively knocked the Department of Health out
of the picture.  We’re not even entitled to cross the threshold of these
clinics.”89  When Illinois tried to enact new regulations to deal with the
findings of the Sun-Times and the BGA, an abortion provider again chal-
lenged those regulations and got the federal courts to strike them down in
the 1980s.90
The Supreme Court compounded the problem by striking down a
hospitalization requirement prior to sixteen weeks in 1983 in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.91  This opinion extended the Roe
framework by invalidating regulations in the early second trimester and effec-
tively struck the requirement throughout the second trimester.
The Court also authorized abortion providers to challenge clinic reg-
ulations and to legally represent their patients, as though the interests of
providers and those of women are identical.92  Such paternalism, which
was receding in all other areas of medicine in 1973, exists in no other field
of medicine—even obstetrics and gynecology—today.
In addition, the ability of state and local officials to defend legal chal-
lenges to clinic regulations was significantly curtailed.  Federal courts ap-
Supp. 471 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Mobile Women’s Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs
of Mobile, 426 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Arnold v. Sendak, 416 F. Supp. 22
(S.D. Ind.), aff’d, 429 U.S. 968 (1976); Hallmark Clinic v. N.C. Dep’t of Human
Res., 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D.N.C. 1974); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008
(D. Minn. 1974), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th
Cir. 1976).
86. See Chi. Bd. of Health v. Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd., 420 U.S. 997 (1975)
(denying certiorari).
87. See Sendak, 429 U.S. 968.
88. See id. at 968-69.
89. Bonita Brodt & Mike McCabe, Abortion Investigation Set, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
13, 1978, at 1.
90. See Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988).  Ragsdale was ar-
rested on child pornography charges in September 1994. See Janan Hanna & Rick
Pearson, Abortion Doctor Faces Porn Charge, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1994, at 5.
91. 462 U.S. 416, 429 n.11, 431-39 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
92. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-18 (1976); see also Stephen J. Wal-
lace, Note, Why Third-Party Standing in Abortion Suits Deserves a Closer Look, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1369 (2009).
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plied the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 to abortion cases,
requiring that state and local governments pay abortion-provider attor-
ney’s fees when a challenged clinic regulation is struck down or when an
abortion provider only partially prevails.93  Without a significantly shock-
ing public health crisis, such as the death of a woman, public health offi-
cials are reticent to support regulations that will likely be struck down and
cost state tax dollars.  Even if a woman dies, however, it is possible for
clinics to block regulations for more than a decade, as they did in Arizona
after Louann Herron died in 1998.94  The Arizona regulations were not
allowed to go into effect until November 1, 2010.95
With disincentives on state officials to create new clinic regulations,
the Court is unable to do anything to fill the vacuum it created.  As a
passive institution, it must wait for a case to reach it—a case made lengthy
and expensive by the conditions imposed by the federal courts.  It was not
until 2000 that federal courts even indicated state officials had the author-
ity to enact or effectively enforce regulations.  Lower courts in Arizona,
South Carolina, Missouri, and Texas upheld meaningful clinic regulations.
In addition, the Fourth,96 Fifth,97 and Ninth Circuits98 provided addi-
tional guidance by finding first-trimester regulations on clinic physical-
space requirements, licensing requirements, and care and procedure re-
quirements not to be facially unconstitutional.
But, thirty-nine years after Roe, the Supreme Court has yet to put its
stamp of approval on any clinic regulations, denying certiorari to the
Fourth Circuit case99—the latest clinic regulations case to reach the
Court.  The lack of a definitive decision is the result of a standoff between
state officials—who do not know how far to go without sparking long and
93. See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976) (amended 1980, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2000); see, e.g., Mahoning Wo-
men’s Ctr. v. Hunter, 447 U.S. 918 (1980), vacating and remanding 610 F.2d 456
(6th Cir. 1979).  The case was remanded “for further consideration in light of New
York Gaslight Club v. Carey [regarding fees] and Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consum-
ers Union of the United States, Inc.” Mahoning Women’s Ctr., 447 U.S. at 918 (citations
omitted).  Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Stevens dissented. See id.; see also
Aware Woman Clinic, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, Fla., 629 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir.
1980) (per curiam) (determining whether to invalidate Florida city’s attempt to
pass clinic regulations).  Thirty years later, in 2010, the plaintiff in Aware Woman
Clinic, Randall Whitney, was under investigation in Florida.
94. See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 536-37 (9th Cir. 2004).
95. Cf. Arizona Abortion Clinic Regulations to Take Effect, USA TODAY, Oct. 28,
2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/states/arizona/2010-10-28-1773749
53_x.htm; see also Will Humble, Abortion Clinic Inspections, AZ DEP’T OF HEALTH
SERVS. DIR.’S BLOG, (Aug. 30, 2010), http://directorsblog.health.azdhs.gov/?tag=
abortion.
96. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl.
Control, 317 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2002).
97. See Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Hous. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001).
98. See Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d 531.
99. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl.
Control, 538 U.S. 1008 (2003) (denying certiorari).
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costly test-case litigation—and the abortion providers—who fear getting a
definitive Supreme Court decision from the Roberts Court which might
uphold clinic regulations after the 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart.100
Where clinic regulations do exist, they may be enforced with some politi-
cal and administrative discretion.  But, as shown by the 2010 filing of Boss-
ier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. Greenstein101 against the 2010 Louisiana law
allowing closure of abortion clinics for violations, the federal courts ulti-
mately hold all of the cards and decide whether regulations are
enforceable.
If the history of the past thirty-nine years is replayed in Philadelphia,
as it was in Chicago, the current furor over Gosnell will die down, some
legislative body might pass new regulations, the ACLU or the Center for
Reproductive Rights will file suit, the federal courts will strike down the
regulations, the state will use tax dollars to pay attorney’s fees to the clin-
ics, the newspapers will turn a blind eye, and the case will never get to the
Court.  The Court’s public health vacuum will continue to threaten the
lives and health of women.
IV. THE LONG HISTORY OF CLINIC SCANDALS AND SQUALID CONDITIONS
Professor Calhoun has amply described the conditions in Gosnell’s
Philadelphia clinic.  The clinic had not been inspected since 1993.  When
federal agents investigated the clinic in February 2010, they found
“deplorable and unsanitary”102 conditions and numerous health and
safety violations, including blood on the floor and parts of aborted fetuses
in jars.  Gosnell, who only worked evenings, was the only employee who
had a medical license.  Another employee, who was not a doctor, con-
ducted gynecological examinations and administered painkillers.  Authori-
ties were alerted when a patient died after being given two separate doses
of painkillers plus anesthesia before an abortion.103  The Philadelphia Dis-
trict Attorney has charged Gosnell with murder for killing an abortion
patient, and the grand jury report found, among other things, that there
had been reports of substandard practices at the clinic for nearly twenty
years without any action being taken.104
100. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
101. 781 F. Supp. 2d 313 (M.D. La. 2011).
102. Report of the Grand Jury at 20, In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury XX-
III, MISC. No. 0009901-2008 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://
www.phila.gov/districtattorney/PDFs/GrandJuryWomensMedical.pdf.
103. See id. at 19; Melinda Henneberger, Kermit Gosnells’s Pro-choice Enablers (Is
This What an Industry That Self-regulates Looks Like?), POL. DAILY, Jan. 23, 2011, http:/
/www.politicsdaily.com/2011/01/23/kermit-gosnells-pro-choice-enablers-how-
clinics-become-death-t/.
104. The 63-page Presentment and 281-page Report of the Grand Jury are
available online. See Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 102; Presentment, In re
Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury XXIII, Misc. NO. 0009901-2008, (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan.
19, 2011), available at http://www.phila.gov/districtattorney/PDFs/PresentmentFi-
nalWomensMedical.pdf.
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But Kermit Gosnell is only the latest.  Philadelphia’s experience with
Gosnell’s clinic is mirrored in other cities and clinics year after year since
1973.  The Chicago Sun-Times’ 1978 series exposed the abortion clinic con-
ditions that flourished after the Seventh Circuit struck down clinic regula-
tions in Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health.105  In
South Carolina in 1994, testimony before the General Assembly indicated
that inspections found bloody, unwashed sheets and bloody cots in recov-
ery rooms in the Charleston clinic of Dr. Jesse Johnce Floyd.  Former
clinic workers testified that fetal remains were not disposed of properly
but instead rinsed down in sinks.  A three-part series by Charleston’s CBS
affiliate (Channel 2) covered allegations, made by former clinic staffers,
about conditions in Dr. Floyd’s clinic.  These investigations led to legisla-
tive amendment of state regulations in 1995, which resulted in eight years
of litigation until the Supreme Court denied certiorari for a second time
in April 2003.106
In Phoenix in April 1998, a young mother visited the A-Z Women’s
Center seeking a late-term abortion.  During the abortion, Dr. John Bis-
kind, who had been investigated by the state board in January 1996 after
the death of another abortion patient,107 tore a two-inch laceration in the
woman’s uterus.  Paramedics were eventually called, but the patient died.
At Biskind’s 2001 trial for manslaughter, a Phoenix fire captain, Brian
Tobin, testified that upon arrival he “very quickly” recognized “that there
wasn’t a lot of competent medical care going on.”108  Biskind and his assis-
tant were convicted of manslaughter, and Biskind was sentenced in May
105. 505 F.2d. 1141 (7th Cir. 1974).
106. See generally Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir.
2000); Peter Nyikos, The Saga of the South Carolina Abortion Clinic Regulation Act, 15
LIFE & LEARNING 363 (2005), available at http://www.uffl.org/vol15/nyikos05.pdf.
The clinic director, Dr. Jesse Johnce Floyd, was involved in a notorious late-term
abortion that sparked the Supreme Court case of Anders v. Floyd, 440 U.S. 445
(1979).  The South Carolina regulations of 1995 did not go into effect until April
2003.  A second suit was filed against the South Carolina regulations after the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in 2001. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant,
531 U.S. 1191 (2001) (denying certiorari).  The district court ruled for the plain-
tiffs again, and the Fourth Circuit again reversed in 2002. See Greenville Women’s
Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, Nos. 01-2090 & 01-2235,
2002 U.S. App. Lexis 27311 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 2002).  The Supreme Court again
denied certiorari on April 28, 2003. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r,
S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 538 U.S. 1008 (2003) (denying certiorari).
107. The Arizona Board of Medical Examiners had held a hearing on January
18, 1996, regarding Biskind’s abortion of a prior patient on February 16-17, 1995,
who died after the abortion from an eight-centimeter vertical laceration.  The tran-
script of the 1995 hearing was published in the Arizona Republic after the death of
Louann Herron in 1998.
108. Liz Townsend, Biskind Convicted of Manslaughter for Botched Abortion, NAT’L
RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Mar. 2001, at 4, available at http://www.nrlc.org/news/2001/
NRL03/biskind.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
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2001 to five years in prison.109  Litigation over the regulations passed in
the aftermath of the patient’s death was not resolved until the fall of 2010.
In Kansas in 2005, inspections of the clinic of Dr. Krishna Rajanna
revealed: fetal remains stored in the same refrigerator as food; a dead ro-
dent in the clinic hallway; uncovered, overflowing disposal bins containing
medical waste; improperly labeled and expired medicines; a carpeted
floor in the surgical procedure room; and visible dirt and general disarray
throughout the clinic.  Rajanna’s license was first suspended and then re-
voked in June 2005.110  In Birmingham, Alabama in 2010, the Planned
Parenthood clinic was placed on probation and entered into a consent
order with the State Board of Health to correct violations of public health
regulations, including verification of a patient’s age and the reporting of
evidence of sexual abuse.111
Newspapers and other media sources have exposed terrible condi-
tions in abortion clinics across the country, including disregard of sexual
abuse reporting, statutory rape, sex trafficking, and fraud.112  The U.S.
Department of Justice lists abortion clinics as a common location where
sex trafficking can be found.113  Just in the past few years, there have been
state medical investigations of the following clinics and practitioners: Ann
Kristin Neuhaus in Kansas,114 Rapin Osathanondh in Massachusetts,115 Al-
109. See State v. Biskind, No. CR99-00198 (Ariz. Sup. Ct Feb. 13, 2001); Abor-
tion Doc Guilty in Woman’s Death, CBS NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2001/02/20/national/main273313.shtml; Abortion Doctor Is Convicted
of Manslaughter in Woman’s Death, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2001, at 20, available at http:/
/articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-02-21/news/0102210245_1_louanne-herron-
carol-stuart-schadoff-dr-john-biskind.
110. See Consent Order, In re Krishna Rajanna, No. 50-H (Kan. Bd. of Healing
Arts Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.ksbha.org/boardactions/Documents/rajanna.
pdf; Final Order, In re Krishna Rajanna, No. 50-H-58 (Kan. Bd. of Healing Arts
June 14, 2005), http://www.ksbha.org/boardactions/Documents/rajanna3.pdf; see
also 2005 Board Actions, KAN. ST. BD. OF HEALING ARTS, http://www.ksbha.org/
boardactions/Years/05bdact.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
111. See Consent Agreement, Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Health v. Planned
Parenthood of Ala., Inc., No. 09-0229 (Ala. Bd. of Health Jan. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.cbs42.com/media/lib/124/0/8/d/08dd6ea6-7367-4fac-8332-
973e5935eb17/PP_CON.AGREEMENT.pdf.
112. See, e.g., Bob LaMendola, State Suspended Tamarac Doctor Who Didn’t Re-
port Pregnant 12-Year-Old as Possible Abuse, SUNSENTINEL.COM, Oct. 1, 2011,
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/health/fl-hk-pregnant-12yearold-20110930,0,68446
21,print.story.
113. See Graeme R. Newman, The Exploitation of Trafficked Women, in PROBLEM-
ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE (Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Problem-Specific Guide Series no. 38, Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://
www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/pop/e02061007.pdf.
114. See Public Information, KAN. ST. BD. OF HEALING ARTS, http://
www.ksbha.org/public.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2011); Trial Set in Kan. Late-Term
Abortion Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/14/AR2009031401607.html.
115. See Abortion Doctor Gets 6 Months in Woman’s Death, BOS. HERALD.COM,
Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?articleid=
1281536.
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berto Hodari in Michigan,116 Feliciano Rios in California,117 Romeo A.
Ferrer in Maryland,118 Nicola I. Riley in Maryland and Utah,119 Randall
Whitney in Orlando, Florida,120 Andrew Rutland in San Gabriel, Califor-
nia,121 James Pendergraft in Florida,122 Salomon Epstein in Jackson
Heights, New York,123 and the Northern Illinois Women’s Center in Rock-
ford, Illinois.124  Steven Chase Brigham, who has been under investigation
for years in several states, had his license suspended and was imprisoned
after being investigated nearly twenty years earlier.125
In the summer of 2011, the Chicago Tribune found six deaths and
4,000 injuries that had never been reported by the Illinois Department of
Health.126  The need for clinic regulations is clear from the investigations
of these and other clinics across the country.
116. See Abortion Clinics Investigated for Dumping Waste and Patient Records,
FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 19, 2008 (on file with author).
117. See North Carolina Mental Health Provider Sentenced to Prison, MEDICAID
FRAUD REP. (Nat’l Assoc. of Medicaid Fraud Control Units, Washington, D.C.),
Sept./Oct. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.namfcu.net/resources/medicaid-
fraud-reports-newsletters/2010-publications/10SeptOct.pdf.
118. See MD. BD. OF PHYSICIANS, SANCTIONS: SEPTEMBER 2010, at 1 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.mbp.state.md.us/forms/sep10sanctions.pdf.
119. Two Maryland Abortion Doctors Face Murder Charges, CNN, Dec. 30, 2011,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-30/justice/justice_maryland-abortion-doctors-
murder_1_steven-brigham-abortion-clinic-fetuses?_s=PM:JUSTICE; see also Media
Alert, Div. of Occupational and Prof’l Licensing, Utah Dep’t of Commerce, Divi-
sion of Occupational and Professional Licensing Enters Stipulation and Order
with Nicola Irene Riley over Unlawful Conduct Regarding Her Utah Medical Li-
censes (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.commerce.utah.gov/releases/11-
08-31_opl-nicola-riley-stipulation.pdf.
120. Sheryl Young, Florida Abortion Doctor in Trouble Is One of Several This Month,
EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/faith-politics-in-
tampa-bay/florida-abortion-doctor-trouble-is-one-of-several-this-month.
121. Courtney Perkes, Abortion Doctor Gives Up License Again over Death, ORANGE
CNTY. REG., Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/rutland-285561-
death-license.html.
122. Kelli Cook, Doctor’s License Suspended for Fourth Time, CFNEWS13.COM, Aug.
11, 2010 (on file with author).
123. See Steven Ertelt, Health Department Probes NY Abortionist Who Killed Woman
in Failed Abortion, LIFENEWS.COM, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.lifenews.com/2010/
02/23/state-4839/; Michael J. Feeney et al., Queens Clinic A1 Medicine Probed After
Alexandra Nunez Is Fatally Injured While Undergoing Abortion, NYDAILYNEWS.COM, Jan.
27, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/queens-clinic-a1-medicine-probed-
alexandra-nunez-fatally-injured-undergoing-abortion-article-1.460728.
124. See Corina Curry, Rockford Abortion Clinic’s License Suspended Indefinitely,
ROCKFORD REG. STAR, Sept. 30, 2011, available at http://www.rrstar.com/
top_stories/x824871591/Rockford-abortion-clinic-s-license-suspended-indefinitely.
125. See Susan K. Livio, N.J. Physician Disciplinary Board Suspends License of Con-
troversial Abortion Doctor, NJ.COM, Oct. 13, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/in-
dex.ssf/2010/10/nj_asks_physician_disciplinary.html; Hermann, supra note 83.
126. See Megan Twohey, State Abortion Records Full of Recording Gaps, CHI. TRIB.,
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Beyond the publicized incidents, accurately assessing the risks is sig-
nificantly complicated by the fact that abortion injuries and deaths are
laundered out of the United States public health system through a series
of filters.  The first is haphazard data.  There are two national organiza-
tions that collect data: the Alan Guttmacher Institute and the CDC.  There
is no federal reporting law—reporting to both is voluntary.127  State laws
are haphazardly enforced.128  In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists,129 the Supreme Court invalidated reporting require-
ments, and other federal courts have invalidated some states’ reporting
requirements, which are necessary for public health monitoring and over-
sight.130  California, for example, accounts for twenty-five percent of all
abortions in the United States, but has not reported its data to the CDC
for years, so California abortions can only be estimated.131
The second filter is in the clinics.  Clinics typically tell a patient who
suffers complications to go to the nearest emergency room (ER).  By urg-
ing women to go to the nearest ER, clinics do not see the injuries they
cause.  Furthermore, only twenty-six states require reporting of complica-
tions, but if they do, neither the clinic nor the ER is inclined to keep
records and neither do so.132
The third filter is in the ER.  The ER doctor may have no reason to
suspect abortion or may simply report the presenting symptoms rather
than the underlying cause.  The coding procedures (addressed below)
give the ER doctor a financial incentive to report the woman’s condition
as caused by something else, like embolism, sepsis, or cardiomyopathy.  ER
doctors are paid (reimbursed) more if they submit the billing as “treat-
ment for septic shock” rather than “abortion.”
127. The CDC’s data is collected by two different agencies that use different
definitions: the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) and the Pregnancy Mortal-
ity Surveillance System (PMSS).  Between 1995 and 1997, only fifty-four percent of
the deaths identified were reported in both systems. See generally Andrea P. Mac-
Kay et al., An Assessment of Pregnancy-Related Mortality in the United States, 19 PEDIAT-
RIC & PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 206 (2005).
128. See Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access
to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 6, 7 n.3 (2008) (“Many
state health departments are able to obtain only incomplete data from abortion
providers, and in some states, only 40-50% of abortions are reported.”).
129. 476 U.S. 747, 764-68 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  In Casey, the Court held that certain report-
ing requirements that do not place an undue burden on a woman’s right to
choose are valid. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
130. See, e.g., Mahoning Women’s Ctr. v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir.
1979), vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S. 918 (1980).
131. See Jones et al., supra note 128, at 7 (citing data on state abortion clinics
that report).
132. See Rebekah Saul, Abortion Reporting in the United States: An Examination of
the Federal-State Partnership, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 244, 247 (1998); Abortion Reporting
Requirements, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1,
2012, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ARR.pdf
(examining which states have reporting requirements).
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Payment mechanisms are the fourth filter.  Because most abortions in
the United States are paid for with cash, there is no submission of the
procedure to a third-party payer and no financial record of the
transaction.
Coding requirements are the fifth filter.  Those abortions that are
billed to insurance companies are billed according to coding require-
ments (current procedural technology (CPT) codes) and must be linked
with an International Classification of Disease (ICD) code.  The ICD-9
codes (the current version used in the United States) lump four different
types of pregnancies together: spontaneous abortion, elective abortion,
ectopic pregnancy, and molar pregnancy.  The ICD-9 codes make it impos-
sible to specifically link a complication to elective abortion.  Abortion is
treated differently than other gynecological procedures, and the different
treatment hides complications and deaths.
The sixth filter is unreliable death certificates.  Unreliable death cer-
tificates prevent accurate statistics on maternal deaths.133  For these rea-
sons, any estimate of complications, injuries, and deaths in the United
States is unreliable.134  In this climate of haphazard data collection and
uncertain legal authority, the Supreme Court’s abortion doctrine has dic-
tated deference to providers and against public health officials.
V. THE GROWING INTERNATIONAL DATA ON THE
LONG-TERM MEDICAL RISKS
The Court legalized abortion in 1973 without a factual record and
without critically examining the then-existing medical literature.  Conse-
quently, the haphazard federal and state data collection system that has
resulted from Roe has created a vacuum when it comes to reliably assessing
the long-term risks of abortion.  But much has changed in the past thirty-
133. See CARLA ABOUZAHR & TESSA WARDLAW, MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 2000:
ESTIMATES DEVELOPED BY WHO, UNICEF, AND UNFPA 4 (2004) [hereinafter WHO
REPORT ON 2000], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/
9241562706.pdf; LALE SAY ET AL., MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 2005: ESTIMATES DEVEL-
OPED BY WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA AND THE WORLD BANK (2007) [hereinafter WHO
REPORT ON 2005], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2007/
9789241596213_eng.pdf; Deneux-Tharaux et al., supra note 79, at 684-85; Isabelle
L. Horon, Underreporting of Maternal Deaths on Death Certificates and the Magnitude of
the Problem of Maternal Mortality, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 478 (2005); Reardon et al.,
supra note 76, at 280-81.
134. See WHO REPORT ON 2000, supra note 133, at 4 (“[A]ll existing estimates
of maternal mortality are subject to greater or lesser degrees of uncertainty.”);
WHO REPORT ON 2005, supra note 133 (showing that WHO has used seven differ-
ent methods to estimate maternal mortality); Chang et al., supra note 79; Laurie D.
Elam-Evans et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2000, 52 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WKLY. REP., no. SS-12, 2003; Horon, supra note 133, at 478; Donna J. Harri-
son, Removing the Roadblocks from Achieving MDG 5 by Improving the Data on Maternal
Mortality: How Faulty Definitions of “Abortion,” “Safe Abortion,” and “Unsafe Abortion” in
Reproductive Health Indicators for Global Monitoring Lead to Miscalculating the Causes of
Maternal Mortality 1-8 (Int’l Orgs. Research Grp. Briefing Paper No. 5), available at
http://www.c-fam.org/docLib/20090514_Removing_the_Roadblocksfinal.pdf.
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nine years.  The risks of abortion have been studied internationally in
medical journals for decades, and the studies have been increasing in
number and sophistication in the last decade, especially.  Not only do nu-
merous countries have data to draw on, but many have better data than
the United States because they have centralized medical systems that track
and report every abortion (which the nation’s medical system pays for).
The data need to be handled with care, however.  Women are ulti-
mately interested in whether abortion causes any particular medical or psy-
chological outcome.  The answer to this causality question depends not on
any one study but on a number of studies, each conducted according to
reliable methods.  Association should not be confused with causation, and
the data should be accurately described and not exaggerated.  One study
cannot settle a medical issue, and more are needed, but dozens currently
exist on the long-term risks of abortion.  The world-wide body of data on
abortion risks should not be dismissed by citing a conclusory statement by
some established medical organization or by noting that some published
studies have found no increased risk.135
A. A 2003 “Benchmark”
A landmark article in the January 2003 issue of the Obstetrical and Gyn-
ecological Survey (OGS)—one of the three leading obstetrical journals in
the United States—examined medical studies of abortion going back to
the 1960s to assess the long-term physical and psychological health conse-
quences for women from induced abortion.136  The authors noted that
“[t]he high prevalence of a history of induced abortion means that even
small positive or negative effects on long-term health could influence the
lives of many women and their families,” and that until “a large epidemio-
logic, cohort study” is completed, “women are making important health
decisions with incomplete information.”137
The OGS authors emphasized three important conclusions:
– [W]omen contemplating their first induced abortion early in
their reproductive life should be informed of two major long-
term health consequences.  First, their risk of subsequent
preterm birth, particularly of a very low-birth weight infant,
will be elevated above their baseline risk in the current preg-
nancy.  Second, they will lose the protective effect of a full-
term delivery on their lifetime risk of breast carcinoma.  This
135. See generally BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON
MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION (2008), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/wo-
men/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf; Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion
and Long-Term Mental Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRA-
CEPTION 436 (2008).
136. See generally John M. Thorp, Jr. et al., Long-Term Physical and Psychological
Health Consequences of Induced Abortion: Review of the Evidence, 58 OBSTETRICAL & GYN-
ECOLOGICAL SURV. 67 (2003) (assessing long-term consequences).
137. See id. at 68, 77.
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loss of protection will be in proportion to the length of time
that elapses before they experience their first delivery.138
– Increased rates of placenta previa and the disputed indepen-
dent risk of induced abortion on breast cancer risk warrant
mention as well.139
– [P]reterm delivery and depression are important conditions in
women’s health and avoidance of induced abortion has poten-
tial as a strategy to reduce their prevalence.140
Together with the OGS study, the international medical literature is
growing and numerous studies have begun to provide significant evidence
suggesting six long-term physical and psychological risks from abortion
that need to be seriously considered:
– Increased risk of pre-term birth (or premature delivery) in fu-
ture pregnancies;141
– Increased risk of placenta previa in future pregnancies;142
– Increased incidence of drug and alcohol abuse;143
– Increased incidence of suicide and psychiatric admission after
abortion;144
– Loss of the protective effect against breast cancer of a first full-
term pregnancy;145 and
– Increased incidence of violence and assault after abortion.146
What is impressive about the recent data on the long-term risks of
abortion to women is the growth of the number of studies, over several
decades, from numerous countries.  These studies need to be carefully
read and considered, especially by doctors.  But—as the OGS authors rec-
ommend—women also need to have a dialogue with their doctors about
the data, not only for their immediate decision about abortion, but also
for their long-term health monitoring.
138. Id. at 77.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 67.
141. See supra notes 137-40; infra notes 147-49.
142. See infra notes 155-56.
143. See infra notes 157-60.
144. See infra notes 162-68.
145. See infra notes 174-78.
146. See Mika Gissler et al., Injury Deaths, Suicides and Homicides Associated with
Pregnancy, Finland 1987-2000, 15 EURO. J. PUB. HEALTH 459 (2005); Mika Gissler &
Elina Hemminki, Pregnancy-Related Violent Deaths, 27 SCAND. J. PUB. HEALTH 54
(1999); Elizabeth M. Shadigian & Samuel T. Bauer, Pregnancy-Associated Death: A
Qualitative Systematic Review of Homicide and Suicide, 60 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGI-
CAL SURV. 183 (2005).
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B. Pre-term Birth
Pre-term birth means birth before thirty-seven weeks gestation.
“Preterm birth is . . . the leading cause of infant morbidity and mortal-
ity.”147  Very pre-term birth means birth at less than twenty-eight weeks
gestation.  Very pre-term birth is associated with cerebral palsy.  The
March 2003 issue of ACOG Today reported that “premature birth has in-
creased 27 percent since 1981.”
The OGS researchers observed that “[d]espite substantial investiga-
tive effort, primary preventive measures to lower the rate of preterm births
have proven futile and rates have been steady or increased over the past
two decades.”148  Over 114 studies have been published finding a statisti-
cally significant increase in pre-term birth or low-birth weight after an in-
duced abortion, 30 of these since 2000.149
– A 2006 report by the Institute of Medicine acknowledged that
induced abortion is a risk factor for pre-term birth.150
– A 2007 study in the Journal of Reproductive Medicine concluded
that complications of pre-term birth after induced abortion for
mother and child cost an estimated $1.2 billion in annual
health care costs.151
– In 2009, three systematic evidence reviews were published that
found an increased risk of pre-term birth after abortion.152
One of these, by P.S. Shah and J. Zao, concluded that a single
147. Thorp, Jr. et al., supra note 136, at 75.
148. Id.
149. See Letter from Donna J. Harrison, President, Am. Ass’n of Pro-life Ob-
stetricians & Gynecologists, to Cecilia Moeller, Comm’r, Office of the United Na-




150. See Greg R. Alexander, Prematurity at Birth: Determinants, Consequences, and
Geographic Variation, in PRETERM BIRTH: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND PREVENTION
app. B at 604, 625, tbl.B-5 (Richard E. Behrman & Adrienne S. Butler eds., 2007).
151. See generally Byron C. Calhoun et al., Cost Consequences of Induced Abortion
as an Attributable Risk for Preterm Birth and Impact on Informed Consent, 52 J. REPROD.
MED. 929 (2007) (listing fifty-nine other studies on risk of pre-term birth going
back to 1960s).
152. See Rosanne Freak-Poli et al., Previous Abortion and Risk of Pre-term Birth: A
Population Study, 22 J. MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 1 (2009); P.S. Shah & J.
Zao, Induced Termination of Pregnancy and Low Birthweight and Preterm Birth: A System-
atic Review and Meta-analysis, 116 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1425 (2009);
Hanes M. Swingle et al., Abortion and the Risk of Subsequent Preterm Birth: A Systematic
Review with Meta-analyses, 54 J. REPROD. MED. 95 (2009); see also Pierre-Yves Ancel et
al., History of Induced Abortion as a Risk Factor for Preterm Birth in European Countries:
Results of the EUROPOP Survey, 19 HUMAN REPROD. 734 (2004); Caroline Moreau et
al., Previous Induced Abortion and the Risk of Very Preterm Delivery: Results of the
EPIPAGE Study, 112 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 430 (2005); Brent Rooney
& Byron C. Calhoun, Induced Abortion and Risk of Later Premature Births, 8 J. AM.
PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 46 (2003).
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elective abortion was associated with a subsequent pre-term
birth odds ratio (OR) of 1.36 (a 36% increased risk) and more
than one abortion was associated with an OR of 1.93 (a 93%
increased risk).
– A 2010 study in Human Reproduction by Emmanuel A. Anum et
al. concluded that “prior pregnancy termination is a major risk
factor for cervical insufficiency,” and black women have an in-
creased risk of cervical insufficiency.153  The more prior abor-
tions, the greater the increased risk.
– A comprehensive study of pre-term birth by Jay D. Iams and
Vincenzo Berghella in August 2010 referenced the increased
risk of pre-term birth after abortion.154
C. Placenta Previa
A number of studies have found an increased risk of placenta previa
after induced abortion.  Placenta previa occurs when the placenta covers
all or part of the cervix during pregnancy.  While the placenta normally
attaches at the top of the uterus, scarring from the curette scraping from a
prior-induced abortion can prevent proper implantation or increase the
risk of abnormal implantation of the placenta in future pregnancies.  The
formation of the placenta over the cervical opening—if it persists until the
onset of labor—carries substantial risk to the mother (including life-
threatening hemorrhage, increased risk of postpartum hemorrhage, and
increased incidence of cesarean delivery) and to the unborn child (includ-
ing pre-term birth, low birth weight, and perinatal death).  In labor, it
creates a medical emergency, making a cesarean section medically neces-
sary to deliver the child, with obvious risks to mother and child.  The OGS
study authors noted that “[p]lacenta previa . . . is the leading cause of
uterine bleeding in the third trimester and of medically indicated preterm
birth.  Pregnancies complicated by placenta previa result in high rates of
preterm birth, low birth weight, and perinatal death.”155
The OGS study found that induced abortion increased the risk of pla-
centa previa in subsequent pregnancies—one study found a thirty-percent
increased risk.  Three studies before 2003 showed an increased risk of fifty
percent after abortion.156  And when a woman has had two prior induced
abortions, there is more than twice the risk of placenta previa—what re-
searchers call a “dose effect”: the stronger the dose (or exposure), the
stronger the effect that can be seen.
153. See Emmanuel A. Anum et al., Health Disparities in Risk for Cervical Insuffi-
ciency, 25 HUMAN REPROD. 2894, 2899 (2010) (concluding that “prior pregnancy
termination is . . . a major risk factor for cervical insufficiency”).
154. See generally Jay D. Iams & Vincenzo Berghella, Care for Women with Prior
Preterm Birth, 203 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 89 (2010).
155. Thorp, Jr. et al., supra note 136, at 75.
156. See id. at 70.
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D. Increased Incidence of Drug and Alcohol Abuse
A number of studies since the 1970s have found an increased use of
drug and alcohol after abortion.  “[T]here is considerable evidence that
having an abortion is a significant predictor of later drug and alcohol
abuse and dependence.”157
– A 2000 study in the American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse
found a “five-fold increased incidence of abuse of alcohol and
drugs in those who had aborted compared with those who car-
ried to term.”158
– A 2004 study in the same journal looked at data from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Study of Youth and found that women who
had abortions had a higher rate of subsequent substance abuse
than women who had never been pregnant or women who
gave birth after unexpected pregnancies.159
– A 2009 study found abortion associated with depression, anxi-
ety, and substance abuse.160
E. Increased Risk of Suicide and Psychiatric Admission
This risk is one of the most controversial and disputed medical as-
pects of abortion.  While there are published articles concluding that
there is no adverse mental health impact from abortion,161 there have also
been more than 102 peer-reviewed studies published in international med-
ical journals that suggest an association between abortion and adverse
mental health outcomes.162
157. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY, supra note
17, at 784 (citing studies in 1970s and 1980s).
158. See generally David C. Reardon & Philip G. Ney, Abortion and Subsequent
Substance Abuse, 26 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 61 (2000).
159. See generally David C. Reardon et al., Substance Use Associated with Unin-
tended Pregnancy Outcomes in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 30 AM. J. DRUG
& ALCOHOL ABUSE 369 (2004).
160. See generally Priscilla K. Coleman et al., Induced Abortion and Anxiety, Mood,
and Substance Abuse Disorders: Isolating the Effects of Abortion in the National Comorbidity
Survey, 43 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 770 (2009).
161. See, e.g., Charles et al., supra note 135, at 436; Brenda Major et al., Abor-
tion and Mental Health: Evaluating the Evidence, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863 (2009);
Trine Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disorder,
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332 (2011).
162. See Letter from Donna J. Harrison to Cecilia Moeller, supra note 149; see
also Zoë Bradshaw & Pauline Slade, The Effects of Induced Abortion on Emotional Exper-
iences and Relationships: A Critical Review of the Literature, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
REV. 929 (2003); Anne N. Broen et al., Reasons for Induced Abortion and Their Relation
to Women’s Emotional Distress: A Prospective, Two-Year Follow-Up Study, 27 GEN. HOSP.
PSYCHIATRY 36 (2005); Jesse R. Cougle et al., Generalized Anxiety Following Unintended
Pregnancies Resolved Through Childbirth and Abortion: A Cohort Study of the 1995 Na-
tional Survey of Family Growth, 19 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 137 (2005); Mika Gissler et
al., supra note 146; David C. Reardon et al., Psychiatric Admissions of Low-Income Wo-
men Following Abortion and Childbirth, 168 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1253, 1253 (2003).
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Studies support both sides of the debate: some find an increased risk
of mental health trauma, while others do not.  Certainly there is a need for
additional, extensive research in the years ahead.  Nevertheless, many re-
cent, well-done, peer-reviewed studies show a negative mental health im-
pact from abortion.163  A number of rigorous studies have been published
that suggest a link between abortion and emotional distress, depression,
substance abuse, suicide and suicidal ideation, attempts at self-harm, anxi-
ety, violence and assault, frayed relationships, and coercion.  And many or
most of these have done a good job at controlling for pre-existing
conditions.
A number of studies have found an increased risk of suicide and psy-
chiatric admission after abortion.164
– The 2003 OGS study identified a number of studies which
found that “induced abortion increased the risks for . . . of
mood disorders substantial enough to provoke attempts of self-
harm.”165
– A study by Mika Gissler from Finland in 1996 found a more
than three-fold increase in risk of suicide after induced
abortion.166
– A 2010 study in the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry found that
“abortion was associated with an increased likelihood of several
mental disorders—mood disorders . . . , substance abuse disor-
ders . . . , as well as suicidal ideation and suicide attempts.”167
– A September 2011 study in the British Journal of Psychiatry found
an 81% increased risk of mental trauma after abortion.168
163. See generally Priscilla K. Coleman, Abortion and Mental Health: Quantitative
Synthesis and Analysis of Research Published 1995-2009, 199 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 180
(2011); Gissler et al., supra note 146; Christopher L. Morgan et al., Letter, Suicides
After Pregnancy: Mental Health May Deteriorate as a Direct Effect of Induced Abortion, 314
BRIT. MED. J. 902 (1997).
164. See generally David M. Fergusson et al., Abortion in Young Women and Subse-
quent Mental Health, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 16 (2006); David M.
Fergusson et al., Reactions to Abortion and Subsequent Mental Health, 195 BRIT. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 420 (2009); Natalie P. Mota et al., Associations Between Abortion, Mental Dis-
orders, and Suicidal Behavior in a Nationally Representative Sample, 55 CAN. J.
PSYCHIATRY 239 (2010).
165. See Thorp, Jr. et al., supra note 136, at 67.
166. See generally Mika Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-94:
Register Linkage Study, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431 (1996).
167. See Mota et al., supra note 164, at 239.
168. See generally Coleman, supra note 163, at 180.  In response to critical let-
ters to the editor, Professor Coleman’s study was given a thorough defense by
David Fergusson, who conducted follow-up meta-analyses to answer these critical
letters. See David Fergusson, A Further Meta-Analysis, BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY (Oct. 5
2011), http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/199/3/180.abstract/reply#bjrcpsych_el_
33839 (reviewing Coleman, supra note 163).
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Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Planned
Parenthood Minnesota v. Rounds,169 upheld certain requirements of the
South Dakota informed consent law (H.B. 1166) enacted in 2005.170  Spe-
cifically, the three-judge panel upheld three “advisories,” but split over a
“suicide advisory,” which the majority struck down.171  Judge Gruender, in
a thorough and well-reasoned dissent, would have upheld the suicide advi-
sory, citing “numerous studies” in the record “published in peer-reviewed
medical journals that demonstrate a statistically significant correlation be-
tween abortion and suicide.”172  Furthermore, Judge Gruender noted that
“even the evidence relied upon by Planned Parenthood acknowledges a
significant, known statistical correlation between abortion and suicide.
This well-documented statistical correlation is sufficient to support the re-
quired disclosure that abortion presents an ‘increased risk’ of suicide, as
that term is used in the relevant medical literature.”173
F. Increased Risk of Breast Cancer
Along with the claimed increased risk of suicide and suicidal ideation,
the increased risk of breast cancer is obviously a controversial and dis-
puted issue.  However, at least since 1957, medical journal studies have
found an increased risk of breast cancer after abortion.174  Holly Howe’s
1989 study was one of the earliest in the United States.175  National Cancer
Institute researcher Janet Daling’s study in 1994 also found an increased
risk of breast cancer after abortion.176
Based on the existing data, the OGS study authors concluded that
“clinicians are obliged to inform pregnant women that a decision to abort
her first pregnancy may almost double her lifetime risk of breast cancer
through loss of the protective effect of a completed first full-term preg-
nancy earlier in life.”177  This “ ‘loss of protection’ effect is most pro-
nounced in women under 20 years of age who elect to undergo abortion
rather than continue their pregnancy.”178  The OGS authors, utilizing the
169. 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir.), vacated in part en banc 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir.
2011).
170. See id. at 673.
171. See id. at 665-67 (discussing advisories required by South Dakota abortion
law); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2011), held unconstitu-
tional by Rounds, 653 F.3d 662.
172. See Rounds, 653 F.3d at 675-77 (Gruender, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing numerous “peer-reviewed medical literature” that suggest
connection between abortion and suicide).
173. Id. at 673-74.
174. Segi M et al., An Epidemiological Study on Cancer in Japan, 48 GAN TO
KAGAKU RYOHO [JAPANESE J. CANCER & CHEMOTHERAPY] supp. l (1957).
175. See generally Holly L. Howe et al., Early Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk
Among Women Under Age 40, 18 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 300 (1989).
176. See generally Janet R. Daling et al., Risk of Breast Cancer Among Young Wo-
men: Relationship to Induced Abortion, 86 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1584 (1994).
177. Thorp, Jr. et al., supra note 136, at 76.
178. Id.
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Gail Model, a familiar scale for assessing breast cancer risk from an expo-
sure, concluded that if an eighteen-year-old finds herself pregnant for the
first time, her decision to abort almost doubles her lifetime risk of breast
cancer.
The studies and the data need to be more widely known, and doctors
need to discuss them with their patients.  If doctors will not, women need
to initiate a dialogue with their doctors.  Women who have had abortions
need to discuss the pros and cons of heightened screening for the long-
term risks.  The public needs to carefully examine the studies themselves,
instead of examining the public statements that interest groups have re-
leased about the data.
VI. CONCLUSION
Accurate knowledge about clinic conditions and the short-term and
long-term risks is essential before any productive discussion of clinic regu-
lations policy can be attempted.  To make sense, effective clinic regula-
tions need to be reasonably connected to the medical risks in clinics.179
In 1973 the Supreme Court created the public health vacuum that
allowed Kermit Gosnell and many other substandard practitioners across
the country to flourish and prevented anyone else from filling that vac-
uum.  The biggest obstacle to effective health and safety regulations is not
creating majority support for clinic regulations; it is the obstruction of the
federal courts applying the Court’s abortion doctrine.  If clinic regulations
are genuinely intended to protect women’s health, they should effectively
do that, whether or not they otherwise “limit” abortions.  But if, as a grow-
ing body of international medical data shows, there are long-term risks
that are inherent in abortion, like the increased risk of pre-term birth,
then clinic regulations can only do so much.  They can never really protect
women’s health.  And the Court, as the national abortion control board,
cannot do anything to fix the situation, except to overturn Roe and Doe and
leave the issue to the people, through their elected representatives, and
the public health system.
179. See Chang et al., supra note 79, at 5 (noting that three main causes of
abortion-related death are infection (33.9%), hemorrhage (21.8%), and embolism
(13.9%)); Maarit Niinimaki et al., Immediate Complications After Medical Compared
with Surgical Termination of Pregnancy, 114 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 795 (2009)
(conducting study based on registry data of all women in Finland undergoing in-
duced abortion from 2000 to 2006 with gestational duration of sixty-three days or
less, and finding “medical termination is associated with a higher incidence of ad-
verse events” than surgical abortion).
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